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After stressing how the attempt to provide a plausible account of 
the connection between language and the world was one of 
Putnam’s constant preoccupations, this article describes the four 
stages his thinking about the concepts of truth and reality went 
through. Particular attention is paid to the kinds of problems that 
made him abandon each stage to enter the next. The analysis 
highlights how all the stages but one express a general non-
epistemic stance towards truth and reality—the right stance, 
according to Putnam, in order to develop full-blooded realism. 
Since the last stage combines a version of direct realism with a 
pluralist conception of truth, the article proceeds by focusing on 
Putnam’s alethic pluralism, carefully distinguishing it from alethic 
deflationism. Finally a suggestion is made as to where Putnam’s 
alethic pluralism may be placed within the constellation of current 
pluralist positions about truth. !
Keywords: Truth, alethic pluralism, alethic deflationism, realism, 
Hilary Putnam !!!!
1. Introduction !
The aim of this article is to analyse Hilary Putnam’s last conception of 
truth, making explicit the aspects he left implicit. Since, on the one hand, 
one of the major traits of this conception is its being pluralistic and, on 
the other, a pluralist spirit permeates alethic deflationism, an effort will 
be made to appreciate the distance—however small—that separates 
Putnam’s conception from alethic deflationism. In the course of the 
analysis, the question is tackled as to whether Putnam’s pluralistic notion 
of truth renders the word “true” semantically ambiguous—a question that  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seems to have been ignored in the literature so far. In order to show 
Putnam’s last conception of truth in its own light, the article starts by 
following the stages that led up to it over fifty years or so of 
philosophical reflection. !
2. Truth and Reality !
The first thing to say in addressing Putnam’s conception of truth is that he 
envisaged a strong link between the concept of truth and the concept of 
the world, so that an analysis of the former is unavoidably intertwined 
with an analysis of the latter, and vice versa. 
Indeed, one of the constant traits of his thought is the conviction that “the 
major problem of philosophy [is] the problem of the way language and 
thought ‘hook on’ to the world” (Putnam 1983, 315), where the implicit 
idea is that a correct understanding of truth gives both a grasp of that 
“hooking” and what that hooking hooks onto. This may happen because, 
intuitively, when a proposition is true, truth can be taken to show the 
existence of a relation between that proposition and the portion of reality 
it is about—whatever the interpretation of truth we are willing to take on 
board. And not only does what we say is true highlight what 
intentionality amounts to, but it shows something of that portion of reality 
as well. Putnam himself revealed that “the problem of intentionality has 
been a lifelong preoccupation of mine, and […] various changes in my 
position were occasioned by the realization that one or another 
assumption about the nature of reference led to deep difficulties” (Putnam 
2013a, 24). 
One aspect that represents another constant trait of Putnam’s thought and 
had an influence in the development of his conceptions of truth and 
reality is his anti-positivist stance. It constitutes perhaps the main source 
of his realistic attitude, since he regarded any positivist perspective as 
heavily slanted towards idealism. The binary development of Putnam’s 
notions of truth and reality went through four stages. In chronological 
order: 
1) Alethic correspondentism ⇔ metaphysical  
      realism 
2) Alethic correspondentism ⇔ sophisticated  
      metaphysical  
      realism 
3) Alethic pragmatism  ⇔ internal realism 
4) Alethic pluralism  ⇔ natural realism 
!
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Roughly, Stage 1 took place during the Sixties, and combined a view 
Putnam a decade later called “metaphysical realism” with a 
correspondence account of truth. He also made an ingenious attempt to 
provide a definition of correspondence, which he later deemed hopelessly 
flawed. The attempt was centred on the notion of “compositional 
mapping”, and elaborated the idea according to which “a true sentence is 
not one which bears a certain relation to extra-linguistic facts, but one 
which bears a certain relation to extra-linguistic facts and to the rest of 
the language. (The ‘correspondence’ is triadic rather than 
diadic.)” (Putnam 1960, 82). This definition was an integral part of the 
metaphysical realism he subscribed to at that time, a view which also had 
three more assumptions: the idea that there exists (a) a fixed totality of all 
objects, (b) a fixed totality of all properties, and (c) a sharp line between 
properties we discover in the world and properties we project onto the 
world (cf. Putnam 1999, 183). 
Stage 2 took place during the Seventies. It inherited the general 
framework of Stage 1, except that Putnam became aware of the 
impossibility of any definition of truth as correspondence. Moreover, he 
recognized the phenomenon of equivalent descriptions  (which amounted 1
to a rejection of (c) above and made his metaphysical realism 
“sophisticated”: cf. Putnam 1978, 51 and 131). 
Internal realism triggered Stage 3. This is a stage for which there are 
precise starting and ending dates: 1976 and 1990, respectively. In Boston, 
on December 29, 1976, he delivered a talk entitled “Realism and Reason” 
(which was then published as the last part of Putnam 1978) where the 
phrase internal realism made its first appearance, while in the course of 
the Gifford Conference held at the University of St Andrews, November 
23-6, 1990, in replying to the talk given by Simon Blackburn he 
explicitly renounced the view (cf. Putnam 1994b). Internal realism has it 
that “the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world. (Or 
[…] the Universe makes up the Universe—with minds—collectively—
playing a special role in the making up.)” (Putnam 1981, xi), so that what 
reality and truth really are stems from our best cognitive procedures. 
Truth, in particular, gets a pragmatist interpretation, in that it is seen as 
what can be asserted in epistemically-good-enough-conditions—an idea 
reminiscent of Charles Sanders Peirce’s account of truth, although 
different in an important respect.  2
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 This is the phenomenon represented by the cognitive equivalence of sentences, theories, 1
or conceptual systems which, when taken at face value, are incompatible: e.g., two 
sentences saying different things about the same portion of reality and being, 
nevertheless, both true (cf. Putnam 2013a, 23-24).
 There is no reference in Putnam to a purported ideal limit of inquiry.2
Massimo Dell'Utri
Stage 4 officially opened in March 1994 on the occasion of the John 
Dewey Lectures Putnam held at Columbia University (cf. Putnam 
1994c). In these lectures Putnam’s realist attitude is influenced by 
William James, John Dewey, the later Wittgenstein and John Austin, and 
is tied to a view of perception which drops every interface between the 
human sensory apparatus and the world in favour of a direct connection 
between them. It is also deeply steeped in common sense. This position 
was termed natural realism, paying homage to the “natural realism of the 
common man” (Putnam 1999, 10). With it Putnam combined the idea that 
truth amounts to many different things—as many different things as 
many kinds of true propositions there are, and as many domains there are 
in which a proposition can be true: empirical, mathematical, logical, 
ethical, juridical, religious, and so on. In brief, truth is not one, but many. 
All four stages represent an effort at showing how “language and thought 
‘hook on’ to the world”. With an important difference: Stage 3 is the 
expression of an epistemic conception of truth and reality, i.e. a 
conception according to which what is true and what is real are a function 
of our best conceptual scheme, and are therefore expressed by the 
propositions this scheme allows to justify, whereas Stages 1, 2 and 4 are 
enlivened by a non-epistemic conception, i.e. one to the effect that what 
is true and what is real may sometimes outrun justification, “because 
what goes on in the world is sometimes beyond our power to 
recognize” (Putnam 1999, 69). But, notice: the non-epistemic conception 
in 4 is of a different flavour to the one in 1 and 2, owing to the specific 
new views on reality and truth which manifest that conception—
equivalently, owing to the specific new views on how “language and 
thought ‘hook on’ to the world”. 
The chief difficulty confronting Stages 1 and 2—the one that made 
Putnam shift to Stage 3—is how to account for the purported relation of 
correspondence linking two sharply separate elements (language/mind, 
on the one hand, and the world, on the other). In fact, a relation of this 
kind would be external to both the elements it puts in relation—in 
particular it would be external to language and mind, so that it turns out 
impossible for a human being to conceive it, let alone describe its nature. 
(Let us call this the Kantian problem.) Such a correspondence would only 
be grasped from what has been termed a “God’s Eye View”, i.e. a 
superhuman perspective which, in contexts like these, serves no useful 
explicative purpose. The moral is hence obvious: 
Elements of what we call “language” or “mind” penetrate so 
deeply into what we call “reality” that the very project of 
representing ourselves as being “mappers” of something 
“language-independent” is fatally compromised from the very 
start. […] Realism is an impossible attempt to view the world from 
Nowhere (Putnam 1990, 28),  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where the realism in question (which Putnam was fond of writing with a 
capital “R”) is metaphysical realism. As I hinted above it was this idea  3
that triggered his epistemic move toward Stage 3—a stage in which the 
interlacement of mind and the world appears at its best, vindicating the 
label “internal” for that kind of realism. 
However—despite the term “realism” in internal realism—Putnam came 
to realize that this was not realism enough, beginning his way back to a 
view in which the independence of the world from the mind and its 
theoretical products is more definite. This called in turn for a novel 
account of the “hooking”, one which would avoid the Kantian problem 
and the implausible account based on mind and the world jointly offering 
good enough epistemic conditions for what is true and what is real. 
This novel account followed the realization that the “‘how does language 
hook on to the world’ issue is, at bottom, a replay of the old ‘how does 
perception hook on to the world’ issue” (Putnam 1999, 12). The 
traditional idea according to which we perceive a given object thanks to 
the myriad sense data giving us information about the many features of 
the object, so that what we are directly connected with is not the object 
but the sense data, raises the same epistemological difficulty in which 
Descartes found himself entrapped: the distinction between a mental and 
a physical substance that are so neatly separated to justify the hypothesis 
that we might after all be brains in a vat. Indeed, what could ensure that 
the cause of the sense data we perceive is an object existing in the world 
out there and not just some computer software linked to the synapses of 
those deluded brains?  Even if we were not brains in a vat, what could 4
ensure that sense data do give us a faithful representation of the object 
and do not distort perception itself in inscrutable ways? 
So, according to Putnam, if we keep endorsing the traditional account of 
perception, we will find ourselves at a loss as to how to account for the 
connection between mind and the world, since it appears unavoidable that 
we appeal to interfaces between ourselves and the world, in the form both  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 It seems that this idea became a somewhat constant trait in Putnam’s thought (therefore 3
valid in his last non-epistemic stance too: see Stage 4 below). In fact, it appears that in 
Stage 4 there is a coexistence of two apparently contrasting beliefs. On the one hand, the 
belief according to which the dichotomy between properties we discover in the world and 
properties we project onto the world—cf. assumption c) above—is unjustifiable (a belief 
that, as we saw, amounts to the acknowledgment of the phenomenon of the equivalent 
descriptions, and that shows how Putnam was still maintaining that language and mind 
penetrate deeply into reality. On the other hand, the belief according to which there can be 
statements that are true or false and whose truth value is doomed to be beyond our ken 
even in principle: e.g., “There are no intelligent extraterrestrials in the Universe” (cf. for 
instance Putnam 2015d, 142). Statements of this kind show that, possibly, part of the 
world is impenetrable by language or mind, even in principle.
 For the brains in a vat hypothesis, cf. Putnam 1981, chp. 1. For a useful discussion of the 4
hypothesis, cf. Thorpe 2017.
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of sense data and conceptual schemes: 
on the “internal realist” picture it is not only our experiences 
(conceived of as “sense data”) that are an interface between us and 
the world; our “conceptual schemes” are likewise conceived of as 
an interface. And the two “interfaces” are related: I saw our ways 
of conceptualizing, our language games, as controlled by 
“operational constraints” that ultimately reduce to our sense data 
(Putnam 2013a, 26). 
Hence natural realism, which—as we saw above—is a form of direct 
realism. According to this metaphysical picture there is no separation 
between the human mind and its environment, so that the problem of 
their relationship does not even arise. But, Putnam hastened to clarify, it 
does not arise provided that we have a conception of the mind different 
from the traditional conception, the one inherited and revitalized by 
Descartes: a mind conceived of as a thing, an organ, a self-sufficient 
entity already endowed with all its powers. Rather, the human mind is a 
system of interconnected abilities that involves the world and its objects 
from the start: 
Mind talk is not talk about an immaterial part of us but rather a 
way of describing the exercise of certain abilities we possess, 
abilities that supervene upon the activities of our brains and upon 
all our various transactions with the environment but that do not 
have to be reductively explained using the vocabulary of physics 
and biology, or even the vocabulary of computer science (Putnam 
1999, 37-8). 
Thus, the elimination of sense data from the account of perception and 
the functioning of the human mind allows Putnam to discard not only 
“the model of the mind as something ‘inside’ us” (Putnam 1992, 357), but 
also the assumptions that remained to be discarded in the non-epistemic 
conception embedded in Stage 1. In particular, the notion of truth as 
correspondence. 
Indeed, the need to appeal to a metaphysical relation of correspondence 
in order to give substance to the “hooking” vanishes, given that “the 
relation of statements to states of affairs ‘out there’ is too internal to be 
thought of as a ‘correspondence’” (Putnam 2015b, 790). Above all, 
correspondence may account for some truths, but not all the truths. This 
has to do with what Michael Lynch has called the scope problem, i.e. “for 
any sufficiently robust characterized truth property F, there appears to be 
some kind of proposition K that lacks F but that are intuitively true (or 
capable of being true)” (Lynch 2009, 4). This is clearly a problem any 
correspondentist interpretation of truth must face: even if we admit the 
plausibility of a correspondentist explanation of the truth of empirical 
propositions, it turns out to be much more difficult to apply the same 
explanation to the truths in ethics, mathematics and the like.  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In fact, Putnam’s later work puts ever more stress on the irreducible and 
unpredictable variety that has to do with the concept of truth: the high 
variety of “scopes” in which truths can be stated, where the empirical 
scope is but one of many; the high variety of the contexts of usage of 
linguistic expressions within just one scope, each governed by distinct 
norms of rightness; the high variety of the kinds of evaluation of the 
propositions’ truth-value. All this nourishes his latter conception of truth, 
a sort of alethic pluralism which combines the idea that there is an 
extendable family of uses of the terms “true” and cognates—an 
extendable family of ways of characterizing the answerability to reality 
truth consists of in new areas of discourse—with the idea of normativity, 
i.e. that “to regard an assertion or a belief or a thought as true or false is 
to regard it as being right or wrong” (Putnam 1999, 69), such that “it is a 
property of the notion of truth that to call a statement of any kind […] 
true is to say that it has the sort of correctness appropriate to the kind of 
statement it is” (Putnam 2013b, 97-8). But, again, 
just what sort of rightness or wrongness is in question varies 
enormously with the sort of discourse. Statement, true, refers, 
indeed, belief, assertion, thought, language […] have a plurality of 
uses, and new uses are constantly added as new forms of discourse 
come into existence (Putnam 1999, 69). 
Let us try to characterize this sort of pluralism in more detail. !
3. Taking into Account the Plurality of Kinds of Truths !
In the current literature there seem to be just two elucidations of truth that 
take the plurality of kinds of truths in due account, and one may ask 
which of the two is Putnam’s position to be ascribed to: alethic pluralism 
proper and alethic deflationism. Both are families of theories, rather than 
compact unified theories on their own. 
Broadly conceived, alethic pluralism can be identified with the thesis that 
there are many ways of being true (cf. Pedersen and Wright 2016). Within 
this vast receptacle one can find both authors who maintain that there is 
just one property of truth which is multi-faceted, i.e. possessing many 
forms, and authors who think there are many different properties in virtue 
of which a statement can be true, combined with the thesis that the 
property that makes a statement true may vary from discourse to 
discourse. Usually, some of the properties so countenanced are 
“substantial”, namely refer to a purported nature or substance of truth. 
On the other hand, alethic deflationism is the view according to which all 
there is to truth are instances of the so-called equivalence schema, i.e. p is  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true if, and only if, p—where p varies on one’s favourite truth-bearer.  5
This is all speakers need in order to have a full mastery of the concept, 
according to deflationists. It follows that truth has no nature (it is not 
substantial) and that either the predicate “is true” is not genuine—
according to the radical wing of deflationism—or it has only an 
expressive utility, not an explanatory one—according to the moderate 
wing. In Paul Horwich’s words, truth is “merely a useful expressive 
device, enabling certain generalizations to be formulated—for example, 
‘All propositions of the form, <p or not-p>, are true’, and ‘A belief is 
correct if and only if it is true’” (Horwich 2016, 100). 
Deflationism and pluralism are incompatible views about truth, since the 
former denies “the key pluralist idea that there is a multitude of 
substantive properties that are alethically potent within specific domains” 
(Pedersen and Wright 2013b, 10), or just one substantive property 
susceptible to many different uses. Yet, both militate against the scope 
problem—pluralism solves and deflationism dissolves it. As to the latter, 
the “scope problem […] will be regarded by the deflationist as little more 
than a mildly diverting irrelevance” (Dodd 2013, 315). But why? 
The fact is that deflationism about truth has a sort of intrinsic pluralist 
flavour. Since you can substitute whatever sentence from whatever region 
of discourse to the p in the equivalence schema, you can take the plurality 
of truths into account in one fell swoop. And you can do this without any 
appeal to a purported special truth property (or properties), according to 
the deflationists. Such an appeal would just be a sort of “double 
counting”: 
it is a kind of double counting to think that [the distinctions of 
truths] strike at the conception of truth involved. They strike at the 
level of the proposition: they mark distinctions of subject matter 
[…]. But why add to a distinction of content, another, mirroring, 
distinction, one only applying to kinds of truth or conceptions of 
truth? (Blackburn 2013, 265). 
For Blackburn, there is only one counting, as it were, and it has to do 
with the content of the propositions involved. A similar idea was already 
expressed by another important alethic deflationist—W.V. Quine—who, 
arguing against the thesis that the word “true” is ambiguous, claimed that 
There are philosophers who stoutly maintain that “true” said of 
logical or mathematical laws and “true” said of weather predictions 
or suspects’ confessions are two uses of an ambiguous term “true”.  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differences involved in taking sentences, propositions or the like as truth-bearers. I will 
also speak in places of the disquotational version of the equivalence schema—‘p’ is true 
if, and only if, p—without calling attention to the distinctions relevant in choosing this 
version over the other.
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[…] What mainly baffles me is the stoutness of their maintenance. 
What can they possibly count as evidence? Why not view “true” as 
unambiguous but very general, and recognize the difference 
between true logical laws and true confessions as a difference 
merely between logical laws and confessions? (Quine 1960, 131), 
namely, again, as a difference in the content of the propositions expressed 
in different areas of discourse. 
Quine’s claim was recently echoed by Charles Parsons (cf. Parsons 2013, 
194), and toward the end of the last century by Mark Sainsbury, 
according to whom 
even if it is one thing for “this tree is an oak” to be true, another 
thing for “burning live cats is cruel” to be true, and yet another for 
“Buster Keaton is funnier than Charlie Chaplin” to be true, this 
should not lead us to suppose that “true” is ambiguous; for we get a 
better explanation of the differences by alluding to the differences 
between trees, cruelty, and humour (Sainsbury 1996, 900). 
Discounting Quine’s and Sainsbury’s reference to the ambiguity of truth, 
Julian Dodd draws the following moral regarding the plurality of truth-
apt discourses: 
the sorts of differences between truths described by pluralists can 
be construed, not as differences in the way these propositions can 
be true, but as differences in the respective subject matters of these 
propositions […] the relevant difference in the truths […] is 
ultimately a difference concerning the things in the world they 
respectively concern, not in how they are true (Dodd 2013, 
305-306). 
What is relevant, in a nutshell, is the extra-linguistic ontological level, not 
the metalinguistic one: decidedly a straightforward and beautiful way to 
account for the pluralism inherent in truth-talk on the part of 
deflationism. !
4. Is Putnam’s a Pluralism of a Deflationary Variety? !
Now, one may be tempted to attribute this line of reasoning to the latter 
Putnam, maintaining that his alethic pluralism is merely a pluralism of 
content. The temptation is strong, owing to a couple of claims made by 
Putnam, but I think that it does not reflect his actual stance. 
Here is a possible source of this temptation. In the course of his criticism 
towards the metaphysical realism of Stages 1 and 2, he stated that 
what makes the metaphysical realist’s response metaphysical is its  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acceptance of the idea […] that our ordinary realism […] 
presupposes a view of truth as a “substantive property” (Putnam 
1999, 55). 
Given that the thesis that truth is not a substantive property is a central 
tenet of deflationism, this claim may give the idea that Putnam subscribes 
to deflationism. However, on a closer reading it is possible to realize that 
what he was actually criticizing is not the notion of “substantive 
property” per se, but the idea that there is one and the same (substantive) 
property in every case of true statement. In fact, he was criticizing the 
metaphysical realist for postulating 
that there is some single thing we are saying (over and above what 
we are claiming) whenever we make a truth claim, no matter what 
sort of statement we are discussing, no matter what the 
circumstances under which the statement is said to be true, and no 
matter what the pragmatic point of calling it true is said to be 
(Putnam 1999, 55; emphasis added). 
The stress is here on the phrase “some single thing” that—according to 
the metaphysical realist’s rendering of the truth-talk—would be in place 
in every true statement, irrespective of its subject matter. A single thing—
i.e. the property of being in a relation of correspondence with a portion of 
reality—that would transcend the content of what we are saying when we 
simply assert a claim. Putnam’s denial that there is such a thing brings 
grist to the alethic pluralist’s mill, since it is natural to think that the 
underlying idea is here that there are many alethically potent properties, 
domain by domain and, moreover, they are embedded in what is said, not 
over and above it. 
All this applies also to another source of the temptation to say that 
Putnam is a deflationist, namely his claim that “What is right in 
deflationism is that if I assert that ‘it is true that p’, then I assert the same 
thing as if I simply assert p” (Putnam 1999, 56). But, again, this is too 
poor a basis to warrant his being deemed a militant in the deflationary 
camp. Actually, this claim both is a restatement of the previous idea—i.e. 
that truth does not go beyond the content of a statement—and shows 
nothing else but the disquotational property of truth—which in turn is a 
general logical trait of truth, therefore taken into account by every 
interpretation of the concept. That Putnam’s stance is far from 
deflationism is apparent in the following passage: 
I believe that the disquotational property of “true” is an extremely 
important one, [but not that it] is all there is to say about truth, 
which is the characteristic thesis of what is called 
“deflation” (Putnam 2013b, 97). 
Throughout his career Putnam was a fierce critic of alethic deflationism,  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and perhaps it comes as no surprise that a favourite argument of his 
criticism had to do with the central question of how “language and 
thought ‘hook on’ to the world”. In fact, he maintained that deflationism 
runs the risk of losing the world, because of its deplorable verificationist 
nature (cf. Putnam 1999, 53 ff)—more precisely, because of the 
verificationist account of understanding and meaning it requires. The 
reason is clear: having deflationism banned truth from the set of the 
philosopher’s explanatory tools, truth-conditions appear useless—they 
cannot explain anything, let alone meaning and understanding. Given that 
one of the traditional competitors of truth-conditional semantics is 
verificationist semantics, to ascribe the latter to deflationism requires just 
one step. However—and this is the linchpin of his criticism—the 
verificationist account of understanding ends with bracketing or 
downright expunging the things in the world: to put it roughly, if “what 
exists” is being taken as “what exists for a subject S” (even a collective 
subject S) thanks to her best verificationist procedures, then the idealistic 
danger of losing the world becomes obvious. 
I think that Putnam’s is a remark in point, even though I find the 
reference to verificationism unnecessary in order to show that 
deflationism is at risk of losing the world. Let me briefly explain this 
before going back to Putnam. 
Rather than being tied to verificationism, I think the risk in question is 
inherent in the Horwichian claim that truth is “merely a useful expressive 
device”, a claim heavily suggesting that truth-talk has just to do with 
language (cf. Dell’Utri 2016). Consider the following typical deflationary 
allegation: 
To explain the utility of disquotation we need say nothing about the 
relation between language and the world. [Our theory of the 
concept of truth] seems to rest only on the most general formal 
features of our language—for instance, the fact that our language 
has somewhat the structure of quantificational languages—the 
utility for us of the concept of truth seems to be a fact which is 
quite independent of the existence or non-existence of interesting 
“picturing” or referential relations between our language and the 
world (Leeds 1978, 44). 
Deflationists correctly detect the crucial point of any elucidation of truth 
in the capacity to offer a plausible explanation of the “referential relations 
between our language and the world”, and quite reasonably see that 
taking these relations as having a “picturing” nature may cause more of a 
problem. But drawing from this the conclusion that truth has nothing to 
do with relations of some kind between language and the world, be they 
referential or not, appears a self-defeating move—even granting that 
these relations are not strictly required when it is just the explanation of 
the expressive utility of the word “true” that is at stake. And that move is  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self-defeating just because of the losing-the-world issue: if truth and the 
world are detached one from the other in this way, then the solipsistic 
picture of individuals mechanically using language as if they were robots 
or brains in a vat imposes itself on us. 
However, coming to Putnam, it is interesting that he eventually dropped 
the argument based on the purported tie between deflationism and 
verificationism, and argued for the idea according to which deflationists 
run the risk of losing the world along different lines. His argument may 
be succinctly reported as follows. In order to function properly, the 
disquotational schema presupposes the notion of translation, or sameness 
of meaning: there are plenty of cases in which the quoted sentence in one 
side of the biconditional belongs to a language different from the one in 
which the rest of the biconditional is couched, so that in the other side of 
the biconditional a translation of that sentence has to appear. But there are 
also plenty of cases in which among the constituents of the sentence in 
question there are words, and a correct translation of the sentence 
requires knowledge of what these words refer to. So, the notion of 
translation presupposes the notion of reference. To quote Putnam: 
That the notion of translation is needed for disquotation and 
therefore needed by deflationists (since their thesis is that grasp of 
disquotation is all that is needed for an understanding of truth) is 
widely recognized. But what I have not seen discussed by 
deflationists, let alone taken seriously, is the thought that 
translating sentences presupposes knowing what their descriptive 
constituents refer to. It is an illusion that disquotation does not 
presuppose the relation of reference (Putnam, 2015a: 324). 
Notwithstanding their scant regard for reference, Putnam went on to 
remark, and despite the formal level on which they place the analysis of 
truth, deflationists unhesitatingly keep uttering claims such as “electrons 
really exist” and the like, taking for granted that the relevant words in 
these claims refer to actual entities out there, just as a realist philosopher 
would have it—as though it was perfectly obvious that this was so. Thus 
the following revealing moral: 
This “semantics-free” version of realism seems to amount to the 
claim that to be a realist it suffices to sincerely write or utter the 
right realist-sounding sentences, regardless of the account one 
gives of what one is doing by writing or uttering them (Putnam 
2013c, 125). 
Since the implicit accusation is that the deflationists do not have a 
plausible account to offer of how a speaker manages to talk of the 
worldly objects and states of affair their statements are about—because of 
their refusal to link the issue of truth with any substantive metaphysical  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issue —the upshot is a picture of human beings using language as if they 6
were in a sort of void: again, as we noticed, as if they were brains in a 
vat. Hence, the loss of the world, a loss that the deflationists attempt to 
d i s g u i s e “ b y m e a n s o f a s u p e r f i c i a l t e r m i n o l o g i c a l 
conservatism” (Putnam 1999, 55). 
As to Putnam’s own position, it is the direct realism of Stage 4 that does 
the job, as it were: it is the idea that we are directly connected to the 
world via perception, and the idea that perception is combined with our 
practical, intellectual and linguistic abilities—which come in a whole and 
are intrinsically world-involving—that ensure a reference to the terms we 
employ. Speaking a language is not a mere syntactic manipulation of 
empty symbols (cf. Putnam 1999, 49), phenomenologically appearing as 
marks and noises that we have to associate with senses. To the contrary, 
sentences that I think, and even sentences that I hear or read, 
simply do refer to whatever they are about—not because the 
“marks and noises” that I see and hear (or hear “in my head”, in the 
case of my own thoughts) intrinsically have the meanings they 
have but because the sentence in use is not just a bunch of “marks 
and noises” (Putnam 1999, 46). 
All this distances Putnam from deflationism and cooperates to shape his 
pluralist conception of truth, in the wake of the later Wittgenstein: 
Instead of looking for a freestanding property of “truth”, in the 
hope that when we find what that property is we will know what 
the nature of propositions is and what the nature of their 
correspondence to reality is, Wittgenstein wants us to look at 
ethical language (and not the kind of ethical language that only 
occurs in philosophy), to look at religious language, to look at 
mathematical language, which is itself, he says, a “motley”, to look 
at imprecise language that manages to be perfectly “clear” in 
context (“Stand roughly here”), to look at talk that is sometimes 
nonsensical and to look at the very same sentences when they 
function perfectly well (talk of “what is going on in so-and-so’s 
head” is an example of this), to look and see the differences in the 
way these sorts of discourse function, all the very different ways in 
which they relate to reality (Putnam 1999, 68; emphasis added). 
From this follows “a rejection of the idea that we can speak of one single 
‘truth predicate’ whose meaning is fixed once and for all” (Putnam 1999, 
68), a rejection which far from amounting to the claim that there are 
many truth predicates, one for each area of discourse, suggests the anti-
Quinean idea we mentioned at the end of the third section, namely that 
there is an extendable family of uses of the predicate “true”. But, it would  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be natural to ask, does this not amount to conceding the point to Quine? 
“Does Putnam, in saying that ‘true’ has a variety of uses, mean to imply 
that the word is systematically ambiguous” (Lynch 2001b, 618) in its 
meaning, showing indirectly that Quine was after all right in his 
criticism? !
5. On the Purported Ambiguity of “true” !
I do not think so. First of all, we would be allowed to say that we have 
here a case of semantic ambiguity only if it were reasonable to assume 
that the use of an expression rigidly determines its meaning, so that even 
the slightest change in the use counts as a change in the meaning of that 
expression—an assumption that fails to have even the faintest semblance 
of plausibility.  Secondly, a clear case of semantic ambiguity is given by 7
homonyms such as “bank” or “step”, which convey different meanings in 
different contexts in such a way that we have to learn those meanings 
separately; but there is no apparent reason to think that “true” belongs to 
this category. Indirect evidence of this is given by Lynch who, after 
giving the name simple alethic pluralism (SAP) to the view according to 
which the meaning of “true” is context-sensitive, claimed “I’m not sure 
anyone actually advocated SAP” (Lynch 2009, 54), thereby implicitly 
answering his own question quoted above. Thirdly, since every version of 
alethic pluralism has it that we use the term “true” in many ways, if this 
were at all a firm sign of ambiguity in the meaning of the term, then each 
alethic pluralism on the scene would immediately suffer from this kind of 
flaw—a possibility so implausible that it is not even worth mentioning. 
Fourthly, even when we want to stick to the meaning-centred reading 
represented by SAP, it should be stressed that a far better interpretation of 
this kind of alethic pluralism has been put forward (but not supported) by 
Wright, who detaches it clearly from any ambiguity case and more 
reasonably sees it as a case of stretching the use of the word “true”, 
exploiting the elasticity of its meaning in a way that “you don’t have to 
learn each type of use separately” (Wright 2013, 126). 
In sum, Quine was too drastic in suggesting that whoever believes that 
there is an ever-growing family of uses of the word “true” renders this 
word semantically ambiguous. And this implies in turn that we are not 
obliged to follow Quine and take the differences between truths as just 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regarding their subject matters, thereby embracing a pluralism of content  8
(as Blackburn and Dodd also urge). In particular, as to Putnam, owing to 
the strong link he envisaged between the concept of the world and the 
concept of truth, these differences have repercussions on the concept of 
truth itself. !
6. Conclusions !
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that Putnam’s conception of truth 
belongs to the variegated constellation represented by alethic pluralism: 
as we have seen, he maintained that different kinds of statement are 
responsible to reality in their own way. This means that different uses of 
“true” are allowed by different properties, and these are all genuine—
substantial, to use the anti-deflationist jargon, where the substance is 
normative in character and is given by the world, in the broadest sense of 
the word. Beside these substantial normative properties—
correspondence, warranted assertibility, coherence etc.—there is the 
disquotational property which, owing to its formal character, allows us to 
use the word “true” across the board, revealing that the latter “belongs to 
the family of the logical words (for example, the connectives and 
quantifiers), which also are used in every area of discourse” (Putnam 
2015c, 559-60). It is therefore the disquotational property that gives the 
concept of truth its unity. 
The discussion about alethic pluralism has been very lively for decades, 
and the relevant literature does not fail to pick out the different problems 
encountered by the many pluralist proposals. Putnam did not address this 
literature, and it is hard to say which proposal he was most consonant 
with. However, it seems that, on the one hand, he was deeply aware of 
some of the problems in question, primary among them the difficulty “to 
do justice simultaneously to the plurality of our uses of ‘true’ and to the 
logical unity of the concept of truth” (Putnam 2015c, 560), and, on the 
other, he would not object to the idea according to which the many 
properties allowing the plurality of uses of ‘true’ represent a sort of 
ground on which the property of truth may be placed, with the overall  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content of statements); and possibly others.
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result that there is 
a single property of truth, and there are many other satellite 
properties hanging around in its vicinity which […] are somehow 
doing something to service the application of the truth-property 
(Wright 2013, 138).  9
But whether or not this is a plausible interpretation of the picture of truth 
Putnam wanted to give in Stage 4 of his philosophical life is the topic of 
another paper.  10!!!
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